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Between Organs and Adoption: Why Pre-Embryo
Donors Should Not Be Allowed to Discriminate
Against Recipients
Mark W Premo-Hopkinst

Many couples unable to conceive via natural means utilize
in-vitro fertilization ("IVF' in an attempt to conceive a child.1 Invitro fertilization involves the external fertilization of eggs to
create pre-embryos.2 Because of the cost and complexity of egg
harvesting, excess pre-embryos are created and often remain
after the IVF procedure.'
At one time, the excess pre-embryos were either discarded or
donated for scientific research. However, the development of
cryopreservation technologies allows excess pre-embryos to be
frozen and stored for a period of time.4 When couples agree to
participate in IVF procedures, they usually complete a disposition agreement.' These agreements are contracts between the
donors and the IVF clinic. They reflect the donors' intent as to
disposition of the pre-embryos upon certain contingencies such
as divorce, death of one or both gamete providers, or disagreement between donors.6 Donors may wish for pre-embryos to remain frozen, to be implanted, to be discarded, or to be donated to
another couple.' One could imagine that agreements calling for
donation find their basis in some level of altruism. But altruism
t B.A. 2003, University of Alabama; J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Chicago.
' Naomi D. Johnson, Note, Excess Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption a New Solution or
a TemporaryFix 68 Brooklyn L Rev 853, 854 (2003) (noting that "IVF is one of the most
frequently utilized methods of treating infertility").
2 "Pre-embryo" refers to an embryo not more than 14 days old. Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 Fertility and Sterility i, vii (Supp 2 1990). Pre-embryo is currently the most
widely accepted terminology but some of the literature uses "embryo" interchangeably.
While this Comment uses pre-embryo exclusively, when quoting other material the author intends embryo and pre-embryo as coterminous.
3 Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 857 (cited in note
1).
4 See Alan Trounson, Preservation of human eggs and embryos, 46 Fertility and
Sterility 1, 10 (1986) (giving a detailed explanation of the process of cryopreservation).
5 Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos. A Need for Thawing
in the Legislative Process,47 SMU L Rev 131, 148-49 (1993).
6 Id.
7 Id.
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is not the only motivation to be considered. Current developments show that the politics of pre-embryo donation present interesting tensions with regard to potential discriminatory motives.
In May of 2005, President George W. Bush appeared on television with twenty families who had conceived children from donated pre-embryos. 8 Protesting a bill supporting stem-cell research on embryos, the President and his guests attempted to
rally political support for what they called the embryo adoption
process.9 In a New York Times article, Pam Belluck discusses the
details of these "adoptions" made possible by Snowflakes, the
embryo-focused arm of Nightlight Christian Adoption Agency.' °
While IVF clinics handle embryo donation through disposition
agreements, Nightlight runs its embryo donation process differently. 1 In the Snowflakes adoption process, adoptive couples are
screened and go through counseling in order to be matched with
a donor couple. 12 Belluck notes one particular pair of donors that
intentionally chose Snowflake out of fear that a lesbian family
might receive their pre-embryos if they donated through another
method. 3 Lesbian couples often utilize traditional adoption or
assisted reproductive technologies ("ART") in order to become
parents. 4 With morally conservative groups pushing for embryo
donation and non-traditional couples at the forefront of ART procedures, how successfully could a donor couple restrict certain
classes of recipients based on discriminatory preferences? Could
a donor couple draft their disposition agreement to prevent donation based on a recipient's race or religion? More broadly, should
the government allow donors to deploy these preferences to discriminate in selecting a pre-embryo recipient?

8 See Pam Belluck, From Stem Cell Opponents, An Embryo Crusade,NY Times A4
(June 2, 2005) (discussing the decision of many political conservatives to add support for
embryo adoption to their opposition of stem cell research).
9 Id.
1O Id.
11 Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 859 (cited in note 1).
12 Id at 860.
13 Belluck, From Stem Cell Opponents, NY Times at A4 (cited in note 8).
14 See Jane S. Schacter, ConstructingFamiliesin a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures
and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 Chi Kent L Rev 933, 933-34 (2000) (noting increased
public attention to gay and lesbian adoption, as well as the legal and political implications of gay and lesbian parental rights); Kyle C. Velte, Comment, Egging on Lesbian
Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization,7 Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L 431, 432-33 & n 6 (1999) (discussing lesbians' utilization of new ART
procedures and other methods whereby lesbians become genetic parents).
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Part I examines a potentially easy answer to these questions
5 which deals with the
from Shelley v Kraemer,"
Equal Protection
Clause and discriminatory covenants in the sale of property.
However, the distinct facts of Shelley and the unique form of
state action involved prove unlikely to apply to the disposition
agreements considered below. As such, investigating the legality
of discrimination requires a different approach. Thus, Part II
frames the issue by discussing case law regarding the enforcement of pre-embryo disposition agreements generally. Part III
presents an analysis of arguments regarding the legal status of
pre-embryos. The three positions discussed recognize preembryos as property, persons, or something in between. The legal status of pre-embryos intimates how current law might provide useful comparisons for discriminatory allowances in preembryo donation. Part IV provides background in two other areas of
law: organ donation and private adoption. These areas provide
useful analogues for determining the permissible scope of discrimination in pre-embryo disposition. 6 Part V argues that the
answer to discriminatory allowances can flow out of a middle
ground: the widely accepted special-respect status most often
afforded pre-embryos.1 7 Examination and application of legal
principles from organ donation and private adoption show that
discrimination should not be allowed in the preembryo donation
process.
I. SHELLEYAND ITS INAPPLICABILITY

In Shelley v Kraemer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
state's enforcement of a discriminatory contract violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. i" The
discriminatory contract in question involved racially restrictive
covenants that prevented current landowners from selling their
15 334 US 1 (1948).

The use of special-respect status provides little analytical help by way of selfdefinition. However, looking to organ donation and private adoption as two analogues on
either side of the middle ground provides some help.
17 In determining that the pre-embryo should receive special respect status the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that "pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect."
Davis vDavis, 842 SW2d 588, 597 (Tenn 1992). The court held that the pre-embryo rightfully belongs in the "in between" category. Id.
1s 334 US at 1. The equal protection clause reads as follows: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." US Const Amend XIV § 1.
16
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land to anyone who was not white.' 9 The owner of property subject to the restrictive covenant, unaware of the restriction, sold to
a black buyer.2" The state courts enforced the contract's restrictive covenants and prevented the transaction.2 ' The Supreme
Court called the state court's decision state action for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the enforcement of the covenants was held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.22
One could imagine a situation where a donor couple enters
into a disposition agreement with a "restrictive covenant" preventing an IVF clinic from providing their pre-embryos to adoptive parents of a certain race or religion. If the IVF clinic chose to
release the pre-embryos in defiance or ignorance of the restrictive covenant, the facts would look quite similar to Shelley.2 If
the disappointed donors brought an action the state would then
have to decide whether or not to enforce the restrictive covenant.
If it chose to enforce the covenant then, as in Shelley, the Equal
Protection Clause could result in an invalidation of the discriminatory provisions upon review.
Of course, applying Shelley requires a state action. Therefore, a clinic must fail to follow the restrictive covenant and the
donor must then seek to enforce the restrictive provisions of the
contract. This situation seems quite rare since pre-embryo donors can choose their IVF provider.
No doubt donors and IVF clinics would quickly adjust to any
potential applications of Shelley. A donor with a discriminatory
intent will simply choose an IVF clinic they can trust not to go
'9 Shelley, 334 US at 4-5.

20
21
22
23

Id at 5.
Id at 6-7.
Id at 19-20.
Many commentators struggle with the scope of Shelley's application and the basis

for the decision. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, ConstitutionalChoices 261 (Harvard 1985)
with David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U Chi L Rev
935, 969 (1989). Tribe argues that the selective enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in Missouri's common law created a racist state policy and thus a state action in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Tribe, ConstitutionalChoices at 261. Strauss, on
the other hand, argues for a broader reading. He argues that resting Shelley on a basis of
selective enforcement undermines the potential application of Shelley to other morally
problematic situations. Strauss, 56 U Chi L Rev at 969-70. As far as scope is concerned,
there is little question that after Shelley a state court's enforcement of a contract would
qualify as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the pre-embryo donation process functions via disposition agreement with
the IVF clinic as mediator, Shelley appears to be potentially applicable. If it were possible
for someone to store pre-embryos on his own, then he could exercise whatever preferences
he desired in choosing a recipient. Without the use of a disposition agreement and IVF
clinic the situation would look much more like independent adoption discussed below, in
Part IV.B.
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against their wishes. Consider the example above of the couple
that chose Nightlife Christian Adoption Agency for arguably discriminatory purposes. As opposed to real property that can last
forever and might pass to numerous owners, pre-embryos are
generally held only by one clinic and lose viability over time.
Shelley then seems even less likely to apply. The inability of the
Equal Protection Clause to get at this discriminatory action via
Shelley suggests the need for a different approach. If the contracts themselves are unlikely to be challenged then perhaps a
broader regulatory approach is necessary. The question then is
how this discrimination should be regulated. The remainder of
this Comment provides an answer by looking to reasoning in
cases dealing with disposition agreements generally, the legal
status of pre-embryos, as well as discrimination allowances in
analogous areas of law.
II. TREATMENT OF DISPOSITION AGREEMENTS GENERALLY
Prior to determining whether a court would enforce conditional or discriminatory provisions, an examination of courts'
propensity to enforce disposition agreements generally will prove
helpful. Oftentimes, a donor's current wishes come into conflict
with a previous contractual arrangement.2 4 State courts have
taken different approaches and arrived at different conclusions
when deciding whether to honor a donor's current wishes or
strictly enforce the disposition agreement. 5 Courts adopt one of
three basic approaches: strict enforcement, invalidation as void
against public policy, and invalidation based on the right to
avoid procreation. 26 The first two categories reflect judicial determinations based on differing policies towards the freedom of
contract. The third approach, invoking the right to avoid procreation, involves a balancing of two competing constitutional
rights to privacy: the right to procreate versus the right to avoid
procreation. The policies animating enforcement and invalidation of disposition agreements are considered more fully below.

24 See, for example, Jeremy L. Fetty, Comment, A "Fertile"Question:Are Contracts
Regardingthe Disposition of Frozen Pre-embryos Worth the PaperUpon Which They are
Written, 2001 L Rev Mich St U-Detroit Coll 1001, 1003 (2001).
25 For a general discussion, see id at 1006-16 (offering a detailed exposition of case
law).
26 Id.
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A. Strict Enforcement
Some courts enforce disposition agreements against the current wishes of one of the gamete donors in order to maintain the
consistency and predictability of such agreements. In Kass v
Kass, a couple entered into an agreement to donate their excess
pre-embryos for research if they were unable to reach a consensus on eventual disposition.2" The couple later divorced without
altering their initial intent to give the pre-embryos for research.29 Mrs. Kass then changed her mind and sought to retain
the pre-embryos for later implantation. ° Relying on the idea that
the contract was an accurate reflection of donor intent, the court
upheld the earlier agreement. 3 1 Preventing implantation despite
Mrs. Kass's wishes, the court stated that the enforcement of disposition contracts "minimize[s] misunderstandings and maximize[s] procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the
authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially
32
personal, private decision."
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Davis v Davis, 33 in dicta,
reached a similar conclusion. Despite the lack of a previous
agreement in the case, the court made clear that disposition contracts would be enforced in the future.
The Washington Supreme Court decided the issue of preembryo disposition based on "contractual rights of the parties
under the pre-embryo cryopreservation contract." 4 In Litowitz v
Litowitz, a divorced couple could not agree on the disposition of
27 696 NE2d 174 (NY 1998).
28 Id at 176-77.
29 Id at 177.
30 Id at 177.
"1 Kass, 696 NE2d at 182.
32 Id at 180.
3' 842 SW2d 588, 597 (Tenn 1992). The court stated that:
[w]e believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred pre-embryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death of one or
more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program)
should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.
Id.
34 Litowitz v Litowitz, 48 P3d 261, 271 (Wash 2002). The trial court and appellate
court decided the case on non-contractual principles. See Litowitz v Litowitz, 10 P3d
1086, 1092 (Wash App Div 2 2000) revd, 48 P3d 261 (Wash 2002). The trial court utilized
a best-interests-of-the-child standard. Litowitz, 10 P3d at 1086. The appellate court balanced the rights of procreation. Id at 1092. Since Mrs. Litowitz provided no biological
material to the pre-embryo, the appellate court awarded the pre-embryos to Mr. Litowitz.
Id at 1093. For further discussion of the right of procreation, see Part II.C.
35 48 P3d 261 (Wash 2002).
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pre-embryos. 6 In their IVF procedure the couple used preembryos created from Mr. Litowitz's sperm and eggs from an egg
donor.3" Mrs. Litowitz desired to use the pre-embryos to add to
her post-divorce family.3" Dodging any questions of pre-embryo
status or rights of procreation, the Washington Supreme Court
relied solely on the predisposition agreement. 39 The agreement
provided that the pre-embryos be thawed after five years of cryopreservation, assuming the couple did not request an extension. °
Enforcing the contract, the Washington Supreme Court ordered
the destruction of the pre-embryos. In this way, like the Kass
and Davis courts, the Litowitz court privileged consistent enforcement of disposition agreements over the wishes of a gamete
provider.
B. Void as Against Public Policy
Two main arguments stand in opposition to strict enforcement of pre-embryo contracts and courts utilize both to invalidate agreements based on public policy concerns. 41 The first considers contractual ordering morally problematic in the family
context.42 Proponents of this argument believe that contracts are
better relegated to commercial and economic transactions.43 In
other words, "it is the altruistic ethic of family law that should
guide [a] court, not the ethic of self-gratification of the market44
place and contract law."
Some courts employ a public policy rationale to invalidate
pre-embryo disposition agreements. In AZ v BZ,45 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated a contract providing
that, upon separation, any excess pre-embryos would return to

36

Id at 264.

37 Id.
38

Id.

" 48 P3d at 270-71.
40 Id at 263-64.
41 See Part II.B for a discussion of cases that utilize a public policy rationale.
42 See Suchitra J. Satpathi, Comment, Gliding Over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillmentand
Responsibility in the New Reproductive Era; Why ContractualOrderingis Appropriate,
18 Temple Envir L & Tech J 55, 71-72 (1999) (discussing public policy concerns with
contractual ordering); Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood:An Opportunity for GenderNeutrality, 1990 Wis L Rev 297, 347-48 (1990)
(stating that contractual ordering "should not be employed in the context of the family").
43 Satpathi, 18 Temple Envir L & Tech J at 71 (cited in note 42).
44 Judith Areen, Baby M Reconsidered,76 Georgetown L J 1741, 1758 (1988).
4' 725 NE2d 1051 (Mass 2000).
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the wife.46 After separation, the husband attempted to prevent
his wife from taking control of their pre-embryos." The court determined that agreements for the disposition of pre-embryos
were void as against public policy. In the court's words, "prior
agreements to enter into familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not be enforced against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions. " " The court's explanation
stated that, "[t]his policy is grounded in the notion that respect
for liberty and privacy requires that individuals be accorded the
49
freedom to decide whether to enter into a family relationship."
Following very similar logic, and relying on the AZ opinion,
the New Jersey Supreme Court also invalidated a disposition
agreement. In JB v MB,5" the couple agreed to donate their preembryos to the IVF clinic upon divorce. 1 After the divorce, the
wife decided that she did not want the pre-embryos utilized by
anyone else and attempted to have them discarded.5 2 The husband disagreed and sought to have the pre-embryos either implanted in his wife or donated to another couple. 3 The court held
that enforcing an agreement "to enter into or terminate familial
relationships," would violate New Jersey public policy.5 4 The New
Jersey Supreme Court explicitly disagreed with Davis and Kass
stating:
We believe that the better rule, and the one we adopt, is
to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro
fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party
to change his or her mind about disposition up to the
point of use or destruction of any stored pre-embryos. 55
A second argument against using contracts to handle disposition of pre-embryos rests on concerns of bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality "refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not infinite."5 6 Since parenthood and the issues
46 Id at 1054.
41 Id at 1053.
48 Id at 1059.
49 AZ, 725 NE2d at 1059.
'o 783 A2d 707 (NJ 2001).
5' Id at 710.
52

Id.

53 Id.
54 JB, 783 A2d at 717.
5 Id at 719
56 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1477 (1998) (describing bounded rationality as
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surrounding family decisions are so emotionally charged, parties
may be less likely to "fundamentally understand the nature and
consequences of the contract."5 7 From this perspective, the inability of contracting parties to take account of relevant information
supports the seemingly paternalistic intervention of courts. 8 In
the words of Cass Sunstein, "[i]f a consumer or contracting party
lacks relevant information, a decision to override the choice is
not obviously an interference with liberty."5 9
To combat these propositions, supporters of contractual ordering point to liberty and autonomy concerns. 60 The courts in
Davis, Kass, and Litowitz recognized informed contractual ordering as the most certain, efficient, and liberty enhancing method
of dealing with pre-embryo disposition. 6 ' They argue that since
gamete providers have the most at stake, they should be the ones
making the decisions. 62 Further, "allowing gamete providers to
[contract for] the disposition of their genetic material allows the
parties greater latitude in determining their reproductive roles
as well as future obligations."6 3
There is no consensus as to how courts should handle disputes regarding disposition of pre-embryos. Depending on the
jurisdiction, disposition agreements might be strictly enforced or
invalidated based largely on the reception of policy arguments
outlined above.
While none of these policy considerations has won the day,
they could provide a hint for how to evaluate discriminatory
agreements. The hesitation of some courts to enforce nondiscriminatory disposition agreements might point more generally
to difficulties for discriminatory agreements. With courts already
considering public policy issues, the public distaste for discrimination could provide a thumb on the scale for invalidation.

a limitation on traditional expectations of law and economics).
57 Satpathi, 18 Temple Envir L & Tech J at 72 (cited in note 42).
58 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with PrivatePreferences,53 U Chi L Rev
1129, 1166-69 (1986) (discussing the effects of bounded rationality as a reason, in some
situations, for government interference with freedom of contract).
59 Id at 1166.
60 See, for example, Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract,ch 1
(Harvard 1993) (discussing these arguments in greater detail).
61 Consider Fetty, L Rev Mich St U-Detroit Coll at 1036-38 (cited in note 24) (discussing the benefits of enforcing contracts).
62 See Satpathi, 18 Temple Envir L & Tech J at 74 (cited in note 42).
63

Id at 73.
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The Right (Not) to Procreate

A final method used to determine disputes over pre-embryo
disposition involves balancing competing rights to procreate.
Since there was no prior agreement in Davis v Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court was left to determine the disposition of
the pre-embryos based on principles beyond those of contract
law. In order to determine whether Mrs. Davis could implant the
embryos against Mr. Davis's wishes, the court relied upon the
constitutional right to privacy. 65 Focusing on decisions from the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Davis court recognized that the overarching right to privacy includes two other distinct rights: the
right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.6 6 In Eisenstadt v Baird,67 the Supreme Court stated that the right to privacy includes "the right of the individual,married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."6" In an earlier case striking down the practice
of mandatory sterilization for certain prisoners, the Court recognized the right to procreate as "one of the basic rights of man."69
In balancing Mrs. Davis's right to procreate with Mr. Davis's
right to avoid procreation, the court assessed both the economic,
physical, and psychological hardships likely to be endured by
each party.7 ° After balancing the interests involved, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Mr. Davis's right to avoid procreation should prevail. Since Mrs. Davis was not certain to use the
pre-embryos herself, and since her opportunities to procreate
otherwise were not extinguished, Mr. Davis's right to avoid becoming a parent was superior to Mrs. Davis's right to procreate."

64 842 SW2d 588 (Tenn 1992).
65 Id at 600-01.

66 Id at 601.
67 405 US 438 (1972).
68 Id at 453.
69 Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541-42 (1942).
70 Davis, 842 SW2d at 603-04.
71 Id. No court has yet enforced a disposition agreement that forces parenthood onto
a gamete provider against his or her current wishes. Utilizing the constitutional right to
avoid procreation or arguments of public policy, courts are hesitant to force the economic
and psychological burden of parenthood on unwilling people. The strict enforcement in
Kass and Litowitz went in the other direction, with the donors' original intent leading to
donation for research or destruction. While the court in Dais suggests that it could enforce such an agreement at some point in the future, the current law suggests that a
gamete provider seeking to avoid procreation has a very strong chance of success.
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Recognizing a strong right to avoid procreation presents an
interesting problem for discrimination in pre-embryo transfer.
Even with a neutral agreement, the right to avoid procreation
could provide cover for the exercise of discriminatory preferences. In jurisdictions that allow contractual ordering to trump
public policy concerns, gamete providers could simply invoke the
right to avoid procreation in order to prevent their pre-embryo
from going to a disfavored recipient. Strict enforcement would
provide a step towards rooting out all potential discrimination
against recipients. Jurisdictions giving preference to the right to
avoid procreation would have problems combating this discriminatory invocation. In Davis,the Tennessee Supreme Court examined a number of factors to determine the burden that procreation would impose on Mr. Davis.7 2 How successfully could a court
distinguish a legitimate psychological burden from discriminatory animus? The institutional limitations of courts, the weight
of the right to avoid procreation, and the ease with which litigants could develop a legitimate rationale are issues to be considered. The point, though, is simply that strict enforcement
would make it easier for courts to limit discrimination against
pre-embryo recipients.
III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRE-EMBRYOS
Ever since IVF and cryopreservation made it possible for
pre-embryos to survive outside of the womb, courts and state legislatures have grappled with the proper status of the preembryo.73 Three potential positions exist, each adopted at some
point by a court or state legislature. The pre-embryo may be
classified as a person, property, or "something in between."74
Each of these approaches contains particular benefits and drawbacks.
A.

Pre-embryo as Person

One minority position, adopted by the Louisiana legislature
and the Tennessee trial court in Davis, recognizes pre-embryos
as human beings.7" Recognizing the pre-embryo as a human be72

See Davis, 842 SW 2d at 603-04 (discussing negative impact of Mr. Davis's child-

hood home life as evidence supporting the burden).
73 See Fetty, L Rev Mich St U-Detroit Coll at 1016-19 (cited in note 24) (discussing
the legal status of pre-embryos).
74 Consider Davis,842 SW2d at 597.
75 See Dais,id at 589 (refusing to follow the trial court's reasoning concerning pre-
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ing prevents frozen pre-embryos from being destroyed. The Louisiana statute states, "[a]n in vitro fertilized human ovum is a
biological human being... not the property of the physician ...
or the donors of the sperm and ovum."76 The Louisiana Statute
also assigns a chain of custodial rights to excess pre-embryos.77
The pre-embryo-as-person theory draws most of its support
from arguments that the in vitro embryo is biologically alive and
genetically unique.7 8 Supporters claim that the pre-embryo has
reached a point on the "continuum" of life such that it should be
protected because of its potential for birth.7 9
Scientific and legal evidence cuts against the pre-embryo-asperson theory. Critics argue that the pre-embryo lacks "neuromuscular requirements for cognition and sentience."" At this
stage, despite being genetically unique, the pre-embryo consists
entirely of undifferentiated cells.8 ' Further, the embryonic axis,
which will become the "embryo proper," does not develop until
later.8 2 Based on this scientific evidence, many argue that the
83
pre-embryo should not garner distinct rights.
Supreme Court opinions suggest that pre-embryos do not
hold a legally recognizable interest. While the Court has avoided
directly stating when life begins, it has held that a state's interest in protecting human life begins at viability. In Roe v Wade,84
the Court dealt with the competing interests of a woman's right
to privacy and the state's interest in protecting life.8 5 The court
concluded that the state could not interfere with a woman's right
to terminate a pregnancy until the third trimester. 86 Later, in
PlannedParenthoodv Casey,7 the Supreme Court "adhere[d] to

embryo as person); La Rev Stat Ann § 9:126 (2005) (outlawing the destruction of frozen
pre-embryos).
76 La Rev Stat Ann § 9:126 (West 2006).
77 Id.
78 See David G. Dickman, Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World. Toward a
Public Policy RegardingEmbryo Status and In Vitro Fertilization,29 SLU L J 817, 830

(1985).
'9 See id.
80 John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status ofEarly Embryos, 76 Va L
Rev 437, 445 (1990).
81 Id.
82 Id at 445 n 28.

83 For a general discussion, see id at 446-60.
84 410 US 113 (1973).
85 Id at 150-54.
86 Id at 164-65.
87 505 US 833 (1992).
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the essence of Rods original decision."88 However, a joint opinion
of the Court rejected the trimester framework, claiming that it
"undervalues the State's interest in potential life." 9 Instead of
prohibiting state interference prior to the third trimester, the
joint opinion adopted an "undue burden analysis."9" In the
Court's words, "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before
9 While Caseyallows states the power
the fetus attains viability."
to regulate certain aspects of a woman's choice prior to the third
trimester, the Court made sure to reaffirm "the central holding
of Roe v Wadd'92 concerning a woman's freedom to choose abortion prior to viability of the fetus. If a fetus-unquestionably further along on the "continuum of life" than a pre-embryo--cannot
justify state interference until that fetus has reached viability,
then a pre-embryo surely cannot under current law.
B.

Pre-embryo as Property

Another minority position treats pre-embryos as property,
with interests equally shared between both gamete donors. In
York v Jones,9 a Virginia court recognized a bailor-bailee relationship between a donor couple and an IVF clinic.9 4 Citing York,
the Davis appeals court implicitly adopted a pre-embryo-asproperty approach recognizing a joint interest between the two
donors.95 Later, the Tennessee Supreme Court criticized the
Davis appeals court for failing to specifically define the interests
of the parties involved.96
Conceiving of the pre-embryo as property would make determinations of ownership and transfer easier since they could
be based on well-developed, existing law. The first and most obvious problem with the property stance is that it undervalues the

"' Id at 869.
89 Id at 873.
90 Id at 876.

91 Casey, 505 US at 878 (emphasis added). The undue burden analysis, while introduced in the joint Casey opinion, was taken up by a majority of the court in Stenberg v
Carhart,530 US 914, 921 (2000).
92 Casey, 505 US at 879.
93 717 F Supp 421 (E D Va 1989).
94 Id at 425.

95 Davis vDavis, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 642, *9, revd 842 SW2d 588 (1992).
96 Davis,842 SW2d at 596.
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pre-embryo's potential for life.9 7 However, the pre-embryo-asproperty theory also presents practical problems. If both donors
receive a joint interest in the pre-embryos then nothing will be
done without agreement between both donors. This would effectively give either party veto power and "the fate of the preembryo will remain in limbo."98 Since clinics cannot store preembryos indefinitely, one party could assure destruction of the
pre-embryos. The pre-embryo-as-property theory provides no
help in resolving disputes over disposition and presents an uneasy moral position. This is why courts have generally not
adopted the position in the past, and why they likely will not do
so in the future.
C.

Special Respect Status

The property and person options for pre-embryo status create potential for the application of current bodies of law and
their discriminatory allowances.99 However, pre-embryos more
often garner "special respect" status. The "special respect" view
recognizes the pre-embryo's potential for life and negotiates a
comfortable middle ground from a moral and political perspective.1 °0 Uncertainty surrounding the definition and repercussions
of the "special respect" view create potential problems. The
vagueness of the term "special respect," and its glaring lack of
self-definition, provide little help in determining what it actually
means for an embryo's status to lie somewhere between property
and person. The American Fertility Society explains the theory
by stating:
[T]he pre-embryo deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual persons. The pre-embryo is due greater respect than
other human tissue because of its potential to become a
person and because of its symbolic meaning for many
97 See Kim Schaefer, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization,Frozen Embryos, and The
Right to Privacy-Are MandatoryDonation Laws Constitutional 22 Pac L J 87, 96 n 69
(1990) (providing more discussion of the idea that society places value in pre-embryos
because of their potential for life).
98 See, for example, Andrea Stevens, The Legal Status and Disposition of Cryopreserved Embryos: A Legal and Moral Conundrum, 13 J Suffolk Acad L 181, 189 (1999)
(arguing that giving joint interest could always result in a veto by the party seeking destruction).
99See discussion of organ donation and private adoption in Part IV. These current
areas of law might apply even more directly if either property or person status was
adopted.
100 Davidoff, 47 SMU L Rev at 139 (cited in note 5).
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people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because
it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not
yet established as developmentally individual, and may
never realize its biological potential.1 "1
While the theory offers little substance for legal analysis, the
moral middle ground avoids some of the problems apparent in
taking a more definite stance. Professor John Robertson argues
that since the pre-embryo "has the potential to be more, it operates as a powerful symbol or reminder of the unique gift of human existence."0 2 Adopting the property or person status presents a host of moral and functional problems discussed above.
These problems, coupled with the wide acceptance of special respect status, suggest that special respect status is the most useful tool in moving towards a determination of allowable discrimination in the context of pre-embryo donation.
IV.FRAMING THE DEBATE: ORGAN DONATION AND PRIVATE
ADOPTION

Since pre-embryo transfer contains similarities to other
more familiar practices, it is helpful to take a closer look at established law that might be borrowed from to craft a law of preembryo transfer. In considering contracts for the disposition of
pre-embryos, the law of organ donation and that of private adoption provide interesting comparisons. Organ donation involves
the transfer of human tissue containing no chance to mature into
a person and private adoption involves the transfer of an actual
person. A description of these two processes, as well as arguments surrounding the discriminatory allowances in each, provides guidance for determining a scope of allowable discrimination in contracts for the disposition of pre-embryos.
A.

Organ Donation

In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act 0 3 ("the Act")
authorized the government to contract with a private organization 1 4 to operate a system for sharing organs. The resulting
101 Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, 53 Fertility and Sterility at
35s (cited in note 2).
102 Robertson, 76 Va L Rev at 447 (cited in note 80).
103 42 USC § 274 (2000).
104 The United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"). David L. Kaserman and A. H.
Barnett, The US. OrganProcurementSystem 11-13 (AEI 2002).
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process involves two steps: people choose to donate organs and
those organs are then allocated. People usually express their intent to donate organs by carrying a donor card or taking appropriate steps to mark such on their driver's license application." 5
When an organ is donated from a cadaver, the first option for
transplant is a biological match in the local area.1" 6 If no one is
waiting in the local area then the organ is offered subsequently
to larger geographic areas-regional and then national-until a
match is found.10 7
Most importantly for current purposes, the Act allows donation based on altruism alone. 10 8 Donors cannot receive compensation. 0 9 Donors cannot donate organs based on discriminatory
conditions."0 Consider the UNOS Ethics Committee policy,
which states, "donation of organs in a manner which discriminates for or against a class of people based on race, national origin, religion, gender, or similar characteristics is unethical and
may not ethically be accepted by UNOS members or transplant
professionals.""' The system only allows a completely altruistic
donation to "supply organs to unknown recipients in need of
transplant operations."" 2
While the current system of legal organ donation does not allow for conditional donations, scholars have considered the costs
and benefits of the option." 3 The central tension in this issue
results from a tradition recognizing self-determination and individual preferences set against the current allocation system focused on policies of equity and justice."' Before getting into ar-

105 See Donate Life, available at <http://www.organdonor.gov/faq.html> (last visited
Apr 25, 2006) (providing methods for how to become an organ donor).
106 Rachel A. Ankeny, The Moral Status of Preferencesfor Directed Donation: Who

Should Decide Who Gets Transplantable Organs, 10 Cambridge Q Healthcare Ethics
387,388 (2001).
107 Id.
108 Kaserman and Barnett, The US. Organ ProcurementSystem at 44 (cited in note
104).
109 Id.
110 See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 USC § 274 (2000). Discussion of discriminatory and conditional organ donation refers to a process whereby a donor expressly
chooses or excludes a class of people.
111Ankeny, 10 Cambridge Q Healthcare Ethics at 388 quoting UNOS Update A:14
(1994) (cited in note 106).
112 Kaserman and Barnett, The US. Organ ProcurementSystem at 44 (cited in note
104).
113 For a general discussion, see, Ankeny, 10 Cambridge Q Healthcare Ethics at 38991 (cited in note 106).
114

Id at 387.
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guments for and against, consider two examples of attempts at
conditional organ donation.
First, a Florida family agreed to donate their son's organs,
but only on the condition that they went to people who were
white because the father was a member of a white supremacist
group." 5 This situation led the Florida legislature to explicitly
ban organ donation directed to particular groups." 6 The St. Petersberg Times article discussing the Florida case also tells a
related story."7 This time the conditional donor is not a white
supremacist, but a Nazi concentration camp survivor who conditioned the donation of her organs on the mandate that they not
go to people of German descent."' With both of these examples in
mind, what can be said for allowing conditional donations, and
what counsels against the idea?
If altruistic donors were well-informed of the situation, directed donations-even if discriminatory-could help classes of
people with disproportionate needs. Wayne Arnason argues in
favor of an experiment matching donor kidneys of Black Americans with black recipients." 9 Since Blacks almost double the
number of Whites on America's kidney waiting lists, 2 ° the ability
to direct a gift might allow for focused support where it is needed
the most. The rationale behind Arnason's policy would also suggest that non-black donors could direct organs to black recipients. Of course, this extension of Arnason's argument assumes,
as stated above, that donors are informed enough to make this
altruistic decision. And it may assume too narrow a range of altruism. Remember that conditional donations, depending on donor preferences, might altruistically send organs to upper-middle
class Whites. However, Arnason's limited point, that wellinformed Blacks would donate to Blacks, seems quite probable.
The question then is whether allowing conditional donations

115 Jeff Testerman, Should donorssay who gets organs St Petersburg Times 1A (Jan

9, 1994).
116 Fla Stat Ann § 765.514(3) (2005)
17 Testerman, Should donorssay, St Petersberg Times at 1A (cited in note 115).
118 Id.
119 Wayne B. Arnason, DirectedDonation: The Relevance of Race, 21 Hastings Center
Rep 13, 16 (Nov-Dec 1991). Arnason's policy experiment would have Black recipients
winning out over non-Black recipients assuming medical need criteria were equivalent.
Ankeny raises an interesting difficulty with Arnason's proposed experiment: How would
transplant decisionmakers qualify black versus non-black? Ankeny, 10 Cambridge Q of
Healthcare Ethics at 390 (cited in note 106).
120 Arnason, 21 Hastings Center Rep at 16 (cited in note 119).

458

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2006:

generally would reallocate organs that Blacks are already receiving from the neutral system.
Robert Sade points out another benefit that might come
from conditional or directed donations. Directed donations could
provide incentive for donation by "personaliz[ing] ... the recipient," thus creating community value not present in the current
anonymous system. 2 ' Sade also suggests that allowing directed
donation would decrease some of the current disincentives to
participate in organ donation.'2 2 Deciding to whom your organs
will go may help those who are uncertain of the system. Sade
states that directed donation can "overcome the distrust of some
who doubt the fairness of the current system, that is, the feeling
of placing a loved one's organs into a black box to be distributed
by unknown others to unknown recipients."'2 3 One weakness
that Sade himself points out is the lack of empirical evidence
that might suggest an increase in donation based on allowing

conditions. 124
In contrast to Sade's utilitarian approach are moral intuitions in line with theories of distributive justice.'25 Committing
organs specifically to a particular group represents an implicit
value statement that members of that group are more deserving.
This concern becomes clearer if directed donations send organs
away from a particular group. Directed donations based on hatred or contempt for a particular class of people create a sense of
moral unease.'2 6 In this sense, allowing directed donations could
undermine the altruistic underpinnings of organ donation.12 7 The
United States' policies on organ donation-requiring altruistic,
anonymous donations-clearly adopt these latter policies as the
most important.

121

Robert M. Sade, Cadaveric Organ Donation: Rethinking Donor Motivation, 159

Archives Int Med 438, 439 (Mar 8, 1999).
122

Id at 440.

123

Id.

124

Id at 441.

125

See Ankeny, 10 Cambridge Q Healthcare Ethics at 390-95 (cited in note 106) (pro-

viding further discussion of the morality of conditional organ donation).
126 Consider T.M. Wilkinson, What's not wrong with conditionalorgan donation, 29 J
Med Ethics 163, 163 (2003).
127 But see id (criticizing the British government's condemnation of all conditional
offers of donation and its statement that such donations undermine "the fundamental
principle that organs are donated altruistically").
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B. Private Adoption
While organ donation provides some analogies, others can be
drawn from private adoption. Private adoption is used here to
distinguish the discussion from any public, state-run adoption
process. 128 While states still regulate private adoption to a certain extent, the state does not actually make individual decisions
regarding child placement. Instead, private adoption occurs either through processes known as independent adoption129 or private agency adoption. 130 These two processes of private adoption
differ greatly, with different actors involved and different restrictions on how children are placed.
Despite the different processes, courts rely on similar bases
for evaluating the resulting adoptions in either circumstance. A
court's main task is to determine whether an adoption decision
"encompasses the best interests of the child."13 ' This determination requires courts to evaluate the fitness of prospective adoptive parents. State statutes often provide factors for courts to
weigh in making this determination. 3 2 For example, one state
statute counsels a court to consider the adoptive parents' ability
"to create an atmosphere that supports the religion, race, and
culture of the child, as well as provide love, affection, and guidance to the adoptee.' 13 3 Courts evaluate the resulting adoption
similarly regardless of whether independent or private agency
processes are undertaken. However, the child placement process
and the amount of discretion allowed the birth parent(s) can differ between the two.
Agency adoption processes are largely creatures of state law.
While state laws differ with regard to details, private agencies
128 Private adoption, in both agency and independent forms, should be differentiated
from public adoption. Public adoption, which is controlled by the state, usually involves
adoption of foster children. See Christine Adamec and William L. Pierce, The Encyclopedia of Adoption 34 (Facts on File 2d ed 2000). Foster care refers to "the system set up to
protect children who are abused, neglected or abandoned or whose parents or primary
caretakers are unable to fulfill their parenting obligations ... placement into foster care
by parents may [also] have been voluntary." Id at 112.
129 Independent adoption is also known as direct placement adoption or individual
adoption. Suzanne Herman, The Revised Michigan Adoption Code: The Reemergence of
DirectPlacementAdoptions and the Role and Duties of the Attorney, 74 U Detroit Mercy
L Rev 583, 583 (1997). To supplement the explanation of independent adoption provided
here, see Adamec and Pierce, The Encyclopedia ofAdoption at 141-44 (cited in note 128).
13( For further explanation of agency adoption processes, see Adamec and Pierce, The
Encyclopedia ofAdoption at 33-36 (cited in note 128).
131 Herman, 74 U Detroit Mercy L Rev at 585 (cited in note 129).
132 Id at 585.
13'

Id.
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must usually get approval and respond to regulation by a state
agency.134 As for the adoption process, the first step is for the biological parents to execute an instrument surrendering parental
rights to the agency. 135 Absent fraud, duress, or misrepresentation, parental rights are permanently severed, and in some cases
severance cannot be revoked.'3 6 The agency then proceeds to
match adoptive parents to the children in its care. This matching
process involves agencies utilizing both state-required and internally developed criteria for child placement. 3 v
State statutory law regulating agency placement often allows some space for discriminatory preferences to operate. States
can allow biological parents to deny adoptions, even those done
through agencies, based on discriminatory preferences. A Kentucky statute prevents state-approved agencies from making decisions based solely on race or religion unless pursuant to the
express wishes of the biological parent(s). 138 States can also require decisionmakers to consider certain potentially discriminatory criteria. An Arkansas statute allows consideration of a
child's religion in placement determinations if a child's parent
expresses such a preference.' 39 New Jersey law prohibits discrimination against potential adoptive parents "on the basis of
gender, race, national origin, age, religion, or marital status."4 0
However, as is the case with most states, these factors can still
be considered as part of the child's best interests calculus.14 ' Besides the state statutory standards, agencies can establish demanding criteria for adoptive parents. One commentator described the situation by stating that, "[b]ecause the demand for
healthy, adoptable infants is significantly greater than the supply, agencies... may discriminate in the name of the child's best
interests."'42
134 See Susan A. Munson, Independent Adoption: In Whose Best Interest, 26 Seton
Hall L Rev 803, 805-07 (1996) (discussing how different New Jersey statutes affect

agency adoption in the state). For example, New Jersey's agencies are regulated by the
Department of Human Services. NJ Stat Ann § 9:3-38(a) (West 2005) (noting that agencies must be approved by the Department of Human Services).
135Munson, 26 Seton Hall L Rev at 806-807 (cited in note 134).
136 Id. See also, Lavigne v Family & Children'sSocy of Elizabeth, 95 A2d 6, 10-11 (NJ
1953) (holding that a birth parent's severance of parental rights is irrevocable because

allowing revocability would interrupt an agency's ability to plan for children).
137 Adamec and Pierce, The Encyclopedia ofAdoption at 33-36 (cited in note 128).
138 Ky Rev Stat Ann § 199.471 (Michie 2005).
139Ark Code Ann § 9-9-102(c) (Michie 2005).
140 Munson, 26 Seton Hall L Rev at 804 (cited in note 134).
141 Id at 804-05.
142 Id at 805 n 18 (noting that some adoption agencies utilize factors such as geo-

441]

BETWEEN ORGANS AND ADOPTION

461

Independent adoption happens very differently from private
agency adoption. Rather than birthparents relinquishing parental rights to an agency that proceeds to select adoptive parents,
independent adoption relies on birth parents to select adoptive
parents and give consent directly to them for adoption. 143 With
the aid of an adoption lawyer, birthparents participate fully in
the adoption proceeding. Birthparents make decisions and
evaluate the fitness of prospective adoptive parents until the
child is placed permanently with the adoptive family.'
States have not always allowed both private agency and independent adoption.'4 5 However, almost all jurisdictions have
moved towards allowing independent adoptions. 4 6 One rationale
for movement to independent adoptions is that the independent
process provides positive incentives for both birth parents and
adoptive parents to go through with adoption.'4 7 Since becoming
legal in most jurisdictions, the number of independent adoptions
has increased dramatically.'4 8 Birthparents consistently report
three reasons for choosing independent adoption:
(1) a perception by birthparents that agencies are profit
oriented and bureaucratic in their treatment of birthparents,
(2) a desire by birthparents to play an active role in the
selection of the adoptive parents, and
(3) a desire on the part of birthparents for the child to go
directly into the physical custody of the adoptive parents
4
rather than into temporary foster care.1 1
Adoptive parents also have reason to choose independent
adoption in certain circumstances. They can avoid long waiting

graphic location in determining suitable parents).
143 See Adamec and Pierce, Encyclopedia ofAdoption at 141-44 (cited in note 128).
144 Herman, 74 U Detroit Mercy L Rev at 584 (cited in note 129).
141 Id at 586-87 & n 26 (noting that Michigan did not allow independent adoption
until 1995).
146 As of 2000, independent adoption was legal in all states except Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, and North Dakota. See Adamec and Pierce, Encyclopedia ofAdoption at 141 (cited in note 128).
147 Herman, 74 U Detroit Mercy L Rev at 594-96 (cited in note 129).
140 A study conducted in 1986 estimated that from its sample 16,040 adoptions were
by direct placement, whereas only 15,063 were via the more traditional private agency
route. Id at 586 n 19.
149 Mark T. McDermott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The
Case for IndependentAdoption, 3 Fut Children 146, 147 (1993).
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periods typical of agency adoption, while also avoiding some of
the seemingly arbitrary agency decisions. 5 °
For present purposes, the most important difference between agency and independent adoption lies in the decisionmaking criteria used to choose adoptive parents. While some agencies
allow birth parents to play a role in selecting adoptive parents,
the information available to birth parents is often more limited.' 5 ' Further, the motives for agency placements are limited
based on statutory restrictions. Through independent adoptions,
birth parents can select prospective adoptive parents based on
any reason at all. While a reviewing court will apply the same
best interests of the child model in determining suitability of the
adoptive parents, the motive for selection is entirely unquestioned. Thus, independent adoptions result in deference to the
wishes of birth parents that probably could not occur through the
private agency method.
Some argue that this control over the selection process can
encourage adoption in general.5 2 Other supporters of independent adoption state that a pregnant woman made aware of independent adoption may be more willing to choose the route as an
alternative to terminating pregnancy."' Advocates for independent adoption also point to the fact that third parties "routinely
connect prospective adoptive parents and birth parents."'5 4 Thus,
a state's legal recognition of independent adoption can "inject
155
statutory accountability" into placements by intermediaries.
V. WHY PRE-EMBRYO DONORS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST RECIPIENTS

Three areas of law play a strong role in fleshing out the proposed legal framework for analyzing discrimination in preembryo disposition agreements. Organ donation and private
adoption have been outlined in a more descriptive fashion in earlier sections and obviously play a part. The right to avoid procreation is a third tool that can be used to analyze whether discrimination should be allowed. To understand whether donors
150 Id.
151Herman, 74 U Detroit Mercy L Rev at 594 (cited in note 129).
152 Lisa J. Trembly, Note, Untangling the Adoption Web: New Jersey's Move to Legitimize Independent Adoptions, 18 Seton Hall Leg J 371, 391 (1994).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155

Id.
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should be allowed to discriminate, this section applies the concepts and arguments arising from these three existing areas of
law to the context of pre-embryo transfers.
A. Applying Organ Donation Law
Organ donation, because it involves the transfer of human
tissues, can provide some direction with regards to pre-embryo
transfer. Obviously the difference between organs and preembryos will cause some disconnects, but ideas with potential for
application can be discerned. A direct application of the laws of
organ donation to pre-embryo donation results in no allowances
for discriminatory donations. Further, an analysis of the debate
surrounding the benefits of conditional organ donation suggests
that such an outcome in the context of pre-embryo donation
would not be ideal. The moral issues surrounding conditional
donation might present less of a problem with pre-embryos. But
a focus on the problematic shortages in the organ and preembryo contexts, as well as the harms caused by each of these
shortages, shows that the arguments for conditional organ donation do not map cleanly onto the pre-embryo donation process.
While organ shortages plague the organ donation process,'5 6
the pre-embryo donation process suffers from a shortage of its
own. IVF clinics often lack sufficient storage space.' 57 Clinics can
only keep embryos frozen in storage for a limited period of time;
therefore, clinics must determine policies to manage their available space. Two possibilities exist for freeing up storage space.
The first option, and the one often explicitly included in many
VF contracts, provides that the IVF clinic discard frozen preembryos at a certain point in time.'58 A second option would involve allowing conditional donation to free up storage space for
other pre-embryos.' 5 9 Conditional donation of pre-embryos could
encourage donation generally, much in the same way Sade argues that it might encourage organ donation.
In considering the need to encourage pre-embryo donation,
as compared to organ donation, two major lines of analysis pre156 Kaserman and Barnett, The U.S. Organ ProcurementSystem, at 15-37 (cited in
note 104).
157 See Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 862 (cited in note 1).
158 Id. Assuming no other disposition arrangements have been made, the University of

Iowa Hospital discards pre-embryos when donors reach the age of 50.
l69 This is the second prong of the pro-life argument for donation. Not only are the
donated pre-embryos saved from discard, they also open up space that provides for the
"survival" of other pre-embryos.
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sent themselves. The first involves a comparison of the problems
caused by the shortage issues in each case. The second involves
one of the same problems Sade confronted: the lack of empirical
evidence to support a claim of increased donation based on condi160
tional allowances.
Comparing the harms caused by each respective shortage
helps to focus on the actual need for increased donation. How
does one compare the harm caused by shortages of organs for
donation to the harm caused by the discarding of pre-embryos?
The pre-embryo status issues raised above provide a good starting point. The organ shortage often results in the unnecessary
death of human beings. The shortage of storage space results in
IVF clinics discarding pre-embryos. 6 ' Saving fully developed
human beings presents a more important goal than saving preembryos that present only a potential for life. While some argue
that "a new person exists from the 'moment' of conception or fertilization, because a new, genetically unique, living human being
exists," the weight of scientific and legal evidence cuts the other
direction. 6 2 The pre-embryo "lack[s] the ability to interact, be
conscious, have experiences, or be sentient-the usual attributes
of persons or rights-bearing entities."' 63 Further, the probability
of a single pre-embryo developing into a viable fetus or eventually a fully developed human are surprisingly low."6 Following
the logic laid out above with regard to when viability occurs, and
thus when a developing human becomes important enough for
the state to protect, the organ shortage is much more troubling.
If the law has not developed toward allowing conditional donations for the purpose of saving fully developed human life, one
would definitely not expect an allowance for conditional donations as encouragement to save only potential life.
Encouragement for pre-embryo donation does not rest on the
same moral foundation as encouragement for organ donation.
The difference in legal status might suggest that encouragement
is easier in the pre-embryo setting, assuming that pre-embryos
fall between organs and humans. Sade lacked empirical evidence
to show that allowing conditional donations would increase organ donations generally. Similarly, we have no empirical evi16o See Part IV.A, discussing Sade's ideas on conditional donation more flly.

161Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 858 (cited in note 1).
162 Robertson, 76 Va L Rev at 444. (cited in note 80).
163 Id.
164 Id at 443 (discussing probabilities at different stages of the developmental process).
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dence regarding conditional donations of pre-embryos. 165 But if
conditional donations lead to a general increase in pre-embryo

donation this could help alleviate burdens on storage facilities.'
Finally, the resulting harms of conditional donations differ
when it comes to organs versus pre-embryos. Conditioning preembryo donation on the basis of race, religion, or sexual orientation might not be the result of bad motives. If courts recognize
pre-embryos as somewhere between property and people, then
one can imagine the application of some sort of limited "best interest of the child" calculation. 6 7 A white gamete donor could
have the best interest of the pre-embryo at heart when conditioning donation only to white recipients. Rather than being motivated by any ideas of racial supremacy, the donor could simply
be acting on the idea that children develop better in racematched familial environments. 6 '
When compared with conditional donation of a pre-embryo,
conditional organ donation could present a more difficult moral
dilemma. The conditional organ donation represents at least an
unintentional negative value statement regarding a particular
class of people, and perhaps includes some hateful motive on the
part of the donor. Also, if a donor conditions organ donation on
the basis of a recipient's race, religion, or sexual orientation,
there are no potential interests of a pre-embryo to consider.
Organ donation laws allow very little space for a donor's discriminatory preferences. Arguments suggesting that conditional
165 One might make a tenuous two-step argument for allowing conditional donation in
order to increase donation generally. If we imagine similar incentives for pre-embryo
donation and independent adoption, and if independent adoption processes encourage
more adoption generally, then similar arguments could be made about giving gamete
donors discretion to encourage pre-embryo donation. See Section IV.B (discussing independent adoption and its effects on adoption generally).
166 Consider Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 861-63 (cited in note 1) (discussing embryo donation as a solution to storage problems).
167 The trial court in Litowitz awarded disposition of frozen pre-embryos based upon
"the best interest of the child." Litowitz, 48 P3d at 264 (discussing trial court's reasoning).
The Washington Supreme Court later chastised the idea because it assumed equality
between pre-embryos and children. Id at 269. The Washington Supreme Court felt it
unnecessary to decide the legal status of the pre-embryos. If a court truly accepted the
idea that special respect status lies between property and person, then one could imagine
the application of the "best interest" standard.
168 There has been strong support from some groups for solely same-race adoption
placement. See, Douglas R. Esten, Comment, TransracialAdoption and the Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, 68 Temple L Rev 1941, 1948-49 (1995) (discussing the position
taken by National Association of Black Social Workers that black children should only be
placed with black families). Consider Elizabeth Bartholet, Where do Black ChildrenBelong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U Pa L Rev 1163, 1174-1200 (1991)
(discussing the history and more current policies regarding race matching).
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organ donation could increase donation in general do not sound
with the same authority in the pre-embryo adoption context. The
need for more donated organs outweighs the need for increased
donation based on the differing legal status of pre-embryos and
people. Donated organs potentially save fully developed humans.
The donation of pre-embryos only provides the potential for potential future life. While there may be some moral support for
conditional pre-embryo donation-imagining some external interest of the pre-embryo-this single idea cannot motivate allowing discrimination. Since conditional donation is not allowed in
the more pressing area of organs, it should not be allowed with
pre-embryos
B. Applying Private Adoption Law
In order to apply any analogy from private adoption law, one
must determine whether the pre-embryo situation aligns more
readily with independent adoption or private agency adoption.
As stated above, these processes vary greatly, most importantly
with regard to the state's regulatory power over child placement
decisions.
The pre-embryo donation process falls more in line with private agency adoption than independent adoption. Independent
adoption involves a birth mother, adoptive parents, and a mediator (usually a lawyer).169 In most situations, birth parents and
adoptive parents make contact via word of mouth or advertisement prior to an attorney's involvement. 7 ° The lawyer then provides the necessary paperwork to move towards legalizing the
adoption.' The job of an IVF clinic in pre-embryo adoption requires much more involvement. The IVF clinic takes possession
of the pre-embryos and utilizes cryopreservation technology to
keep the pre-embryos usable.7 2 Similar to adoption agencies
prior to the rise of independent adoption, IVF clinics play a critical role in making pre-embryo donation possible. Clearly, one
reason that motives behind independent adoption go unregulated
has to do with the difficulty of regulating them at all. How does
one get inside the head of a birth parent to determine whether
motives were acceptable? States are able to regulate agencies

169

Herman, 74 U Detroit Mercy L Rev at 598 (cited in note 129).

170 Id at 599.
171 Id at 598-607.
172

Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 856-58 (cited in note 1).
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and clinics more easily because practices are centralized and
more readily evaluated.
One might think that the ability, in some states, of birth
parents to affect agency placement undermines the differentiation between independent adoption and private agency adoption.
However, the distinction obviously holds up in jurisdictions that
require severance of all parental rights to an agency. Also, the
birth parent's ability to affect placement in the agency setting
need not be dispositive of the issue for pre-embryo donation. The
ability of gamete-providers to affect placement does not necessarily follow from the same ability in birth parents. There is reason
to think that a gamete-provider's ability to affect placement
should not be as strong as a birth parent's. The relationship of a
birth parent to his or her child suggests a stronger link than the
connection between a gamete-provider and an as yet undeveloped pre-embryo. 17 ' No doubt Mrs. Litowitz and Mrs. Davis felt
connected to their pre-embryos, but a birth parent's interest in
the placement of their living child goes far beyond a gameteprovider's interest in the placement of a pre-embryo that may or
may not develop into a child.
Agency adoption provides a useful analogue to pre-embryo
donation. Both agencies and pre-embryo donation facilities serve
similar institutional purposes. Agency adoption has become a
highly regulated process, where discriminatory preferences are
limited. The same cannot confidently be said for pre-embryo donation, a process largely unregulated at present. While governments have not gotten heavily involved in pre-embryo transfers, 74 similarities between the roles of private adoption agencies
and IVF clinics suggest the potential for regulation of a clinic's
disposition policies.

173Much research has been done on parent-infant attachment and some work done on
parent-fetal attachment. For a discussion of the social and psychological relationship
developed between parents and infants consider, Michael Lewis and Leonard A. Rosenblum, eds, The Effect of the Infant on its Caregiver(Wiley 1974). For a discussion of
psychological attachment between parents and their 8-month old fetuses consider, M.
Colleen Stainton, The Fetus: A Growing Member of the Family,34 Family Relations 321
(1985) (discussing reasons for and implications of parents treating their unborn fetus as a
unique individual). The argument suggested in this Comment is that as one continues
back down the developmental continuum the relationship between a parent and preembryo becomes less valuable because similar social and psychological attachment cannot
occur.

174 Johnson, 68 Brooklyn L Rev at 854 (cited in note 1).
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C. Applying the Right to Avoid Procreation
The ability of a court to enforce a discriminatory disposition
agreement raises two major constitutional issues. The first, dealt
with in detail already, involves the potential application of Shelley v Kraemer and the Equal Protection Clause. 1 75 The second
consideration involves the right to avoid procreation. Is the right
to avoid procreation strong enough to justify discriminatory donation of pre-embryos? Can the greater power to avoid procreation generally include the lesser power of avoiding certain instances of procreation for discriminatory reasons?
The above-mentioned disputes regarding the disposition of
pre-embryos recognized a strong right to avoid procreation.
While the Davis court actually went through the process of balancing the interests,'7 6 the AZ v BZ and JB v MB decisions also
recognize the important interest of a gamete donor to make an
unfettered decision to avoid becoming a parent. 1 77 Even though
the eventual decisions utilized language of "public policy," the
courts provided similar rationales. In AZ, the court stated that
no agreements compelling a donor to become a parent against his
or her will would be enforced because of public policy reasons.'
In JB the court refused to enforce a contract that might create 7 a9
child because it would impair the wife's right not to procreate.
In none of the decisions mentioned above have courts forced the
use or implantation of pre-embryos. And when a contract is enforced, as in Kass, the contract stipulates for eventual disposal of
the pre-embryos and not donation or implantation. 8 ° This suggests that courts are very uneasy about forcing genetic parenthood on someone against their wishes. Based on this propensity,
one might argue that a discriminatory disposition agreement
should be seen as a donor exercising a qualified version of the
right to avoid procreation. To accept this, one must assume an
extremely powerful right to avoid procreation-and that courts
are more concerned about not forcing any parenthood on unwilling donors than with preventing discrimination in this context.
This argument fails for a number of reasons.

See Part I.
842 SW2d at 603-04.
117 AZ, 725 NE2d at 1057-58; JB, 783 A2d at 719.
178 725 NE2d at 1057-58.
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179 783 A2d at 719.
180 696 NE2d at 177.
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First, a constitutional right does not necessarily imply the
ability to utilize discriminatory preferences in exercising that
right. 1 ' A second weakness lies in the rationale behind the right
to avoid procreation. The ideas fueling the right focus on the
burden' 82 of having offspring in existence at all. Selecting among
recipients is not procreative choice. In fact, selecting among recipients might just as easily cut in the other direction. If gameteproviders have already shown intent to donate to someone, even
if only to people of a certain class, then they look very different
than Mr. Davis who sought to avoid procreation at all costs.
Rather than a qualified right to avoid procreation, discriminatory disposition agreements reflect intent to procreate under
problematic circumstances. For these reasons, the right to avoid
procreation should not include the lesser right of avoiding procreation for discriminatory purposes.
CONCLUSION

Pre-embryo donors should not be allowed to discriminate by
denying pre-embryos to certain classes of recipients. Analogous
areas of law provide strong arguments against allowing discrimination. Furthermore, in certain rare situations, enforcement of a discriminatory disposition agreement could violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
The difficulty of applying the Equal Protection Clause, coupled with a lack of directly applicable law suggests a new solution. Looking forward, decisions will have to be made about the
importance of preventing discrimination in pre-embryo transfers.
Interesting results might follow if regulation happens on the
state level. First, remember that some states will have to deal
with the tension between preventing discrimination and allowing
a strong right to avoid procreation. Also, different states will
have different ideas as to the application of these seemingly
analogous areas of law. Consider organ donation as compared to
pre-embryo donation. States that feel pre-embryos are far from
equivalent to people might recognize less need for pre-embryo
donation as compared to organ donation. This would present few
problems with requiring the same altruism in both the
181 See, for example, Shelley v Kramer where the right to transfer property did not
include the right to transfer property with a racially discriminatory covenant attached.
334 US at 1-5.
182 See Part II.C. The Davis court made their determination based on both financial
and psychological burdens imposed by unwanted parenthood. 842 SW2d at 603-04.
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pre-embryo and organ context. Where polities recognize preembryos as equal in value to people, the altruistic bent of organ
donation may not lead to the same requisite altruism in the preembryo setting.
However the organ donation analogy plays out, similarities
between private agency adoption and pre-embryo donation can
provide a preview of regulatory possibilities. Regulators convinced that pre-embryos are more like people should jump at the
chance to apply adoption law. As noted above, many states prevent agency placement based solely on race and religion.18 3 Some
states disallow placement decisions made solely on the basis of
sexual preference. 8 The important thing to realize here is that
states have found little problem regulating discriminatory preferences in agency adoption settings.
With the uneasy status of pre-embryos, regulators would be
wise to consult analogous areas of law. Applying the law and
policies surrounding organ donation and private agency adoption
shows that pre-embryo donors should not be allowed to discriminate against potential recipients.

183

See section IV.B.

184

See, for example, Standardsof Practicefor Adoption Services, 18 NYCRR § 421.16

(2006) (preventing placement decisions based solely on "homosexuality" of adoptive parent).

